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SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Does Sexual Harassment Require Proof of Psychological Injury?





Argument Date: October 13, 1993
ISSUE
Is a plaintiff required to prove that he or she suffered psycholog-
ical injury as a result of sexual harassment in the workplace in
order to prove a hostile-environment, sexual harassment case
under Title VII?
FACTS
Teresa Harris was employed as a
rental manager by Forklift Systems, Inc.
("Forklift") at its office in Nashville,
Tennessee. Her immediate supervisor
was Charles Hardy, the president of the
company. During her tenure with the
company, Hardy made sexually deroga-
tory and demeaning remarks to Hams as
well as to other female employees. When
Harris eventually complained to Hardy
about his comments, he apologized, said
he was only joking, and promised that he
would no longer make such remarks.
A few weeks later, however, Hardy
resumed his offensive behavior which
included a remark that Harris used sex to
land an account. Several weeks later,
Harris quit.
Harris subsequently filed a lawsuit
alleging that Forklift had violated Title VII by, among other
things, creating a sexually hostile working environment and
that the environment was so bad that she was constructively dis-
charged, i.e., forced to quit. A hearing was held before a feder-
al magistrate who found that Hardy had indeed engaged in a
continuing pattern of sex- based derogatory conduct.
The magistrate specifically found that, in the presence of
other employees, Hardy said to Harris, "You're a woman, what
do you know" and called Harris "a dumb ass woman." Hardy
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also remarked that the company needed "a man as the rental
manager" and suggested to Harris that they go to the Holiday
Inn to negotiate her raise. The magistrate also found that Hardy
made sexually suggestive comments about the clothing wom
by Harris and other female employees, and commented on
aspects of their anatomy. The magistrate further found that
Hardy asked Harris and other female employees to retrieve
coins from his front pants pocket and threw objects on the
ground in front of female employees and asked them to pick up
the objects, making comments about their clothing.
Having found that Hardy engaged in this conduct, the mag-
istrate, nonetheless, concluded that it was not so severe as to
create a hostile work environment. In reaching this result, the
magistrate relied on the test set forth
by the Sixth Circuit in Rabidue v.
a Glance Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611
(6th Cir. 1986), for determining
the Civil Rights Act when sexual harassment rises to the
'hibits sexual harass- level of a hostile work environment.
1) it is made a term The Rabidue court held that a hos-
loyment or 2) it cre- tile environment is created where
ostile work environ- the harassing conduct "would inter-
ual harassment is a fere with that hypothetical reason-
able individual's work performance)yment, the plaintiff and affect the psychological well-
ljury- for example, being of that reasonable person."
ing to date his or her In applying this test to the facts of
sents the question of Harris' case, the magistrate con-
claiming that sexual cluded that Hardy's conduct
a hostile work envi- would not have interfered with a
ge that the harassing reasonable person's work perfor-
angible injury - for mance and that Harris did not suf-
gical harm. fer any psychological injury as a
result of Hardy's harassment.
Following Rabidue, the magistrate
dismissed the hostile-environment, sexual harassment claim.
The magistrate also concluded that, because Harris was not
subjected to a hostile environment, she was not constructively
discharged because of the Hardy's actions. Accordingly, the
magistrate dismissed Harris' constructive- discharge claim.
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee adopted the magistrate's report in an unpublished
opinion, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The
Supreme Court granted Harris' petition for writ of certiorari to
decide the question whether proof of psychological injury is a
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BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986), recognized a cause of action under Title VII
where sexual harassment creates a hostile work environment.
The Court held that a hostile environment is created when
harassing conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment.
In focusing on the issue of when harassing conduct is suffi-
ciently severe to alter employment conditions, the lower courts
have developed two tests: 1) did the conduct interfere with the
plaintiff's work performance when viewed from the perspective
of a reasonable employee in the plaintiff's position; and 2) did
the conduct cause psychological injury to the plaintiff. The Ninth
Circuit applies the first test, while the Third and Eleventh
Circuits apply the second. Other courts find a violation of Title
VII if either test is satisfied. The Sixth Circuit, however,
requires a plaintiff to meet both tests. The Supreme Court will
decide if proof of psychological harm is a necessary predicate
to finding thatsexually harassing conduct altered employment
conditions.
Mandating a requirement of proof of psychological injury
could adversely affect plaintiffs in several ways. Whenever a
court imposes an additional proof factor on a party, it makes
the case that much more difficult for the party to win. This
effect is exacerbated in sexual harassment cases, where stud-
ies have shown that only a small percentage of sexually
harassing behavior is even reported to begin with.
Requiring proof of psychological injury could deter indi-
viduals from bringing valid harassment claims because of an
unwillingness to portray themselves as mentally impaired.
Were the Court to impose a psychological-injury requirement,
a plaintiff's mental condition would be a fact "in controversy"
and the defendant, as a matter of course, would seek an order
requiring the plaintiff to undergo a psychological examination
as part of pre-trial discovery. Such a forced psychological
examination, with the results available to defendant, would
serve as an additional deterrent to plaintiffs in these cases.
None of the parties before the Court in this case - neither
Ms. Harris, Forklift, nor the many amici - advocate that the
Court adopt the Sixth Circuit's position, thereby imposing a
psychological-harm test in hostile-environment cases. All take
the position that, while proof of psychological injury may be
sufficient to prove a hostile-environment claim, it is not nec-
essary. All parties agree that proof that the harassing conduct
altered plaintiff's working conditions, when viewed from the
objective position of the reasonable employee in plaintiff's
position, is sufficient to establish a hostile environment claim.
It appears unlikely, therefore, that the Supreme Court would
adopt the Sixth Circuit's view and require proof of psycholog-
ical injury.
The parties, however, join issue, on whether or not
Hardy's conduct would have interfered with the work perfor-
mance of a reasonable employee in Harris' position.
Accordingly, the Court is asked to determine whether or not
the magistrate applied the correct test to the facts of Harris'
case in light of its decision in Meritor.
ARGUMENTS
For Teresa Harris (Counsel of Record: Irwin Venick; Woods
& Venick, 121 17th Avenue, South, Nashville, TN 37203, tele-
phone (615) 259-4366):
1. Proof of serious psychological injury is not necessary to
establish hostile-environment liability on the basis of sex
under Title VII.
2. Neither Harris' hostile-environment claim nor her construc-
tive-discharge claim should have been dismissed.
For Forklift Systems, Inc. (Counsel of Record: Stanley M.
Chernau; Chernau, Milam & Weiss, 3rd National Financial
Center, 424 Church Street, 13th Floor, Nashville, TN 37129,
telephone (615) 244-5480):
1. Sexual harassment is actionable only where there is a
demonstrable effect on the victim's working conditions
evaluated from the objective standpoint of a reasonable per-
son in the victim's position.
2. The magistrate applied the correct test in this case and prop-
erly concluded that the work performance of a reasonable
person in Harris' position would not have been affected by
Hardy's conduct.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Teresa Harris
Joint brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the
American Jewish Congress (Counsel of Record: Steven R.
Shapiro; American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, 132 West
43 Street New York, NY 10036, telephone (212) 944-9800);
Joint brief of the Employment Law Center, the California
Women's Law Center, and Equal Rights Advocates, Inc.
(Counsel of Record: Patricia A. Shiu; Employment Law Center,
1663 Mission Street, Suite 400, San Francisco, CA 94103, tele-
phone (415) 864- 8848);
Feminists for Free Expression (Counsel ofRecord: Cathy E.
Crosson; 406 South Eastside Drive, Bloomington, IN 47401,
telephone (812) 855-2596);
Joint brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc. and the National Council of Jewish Women
(Counsel of Record: Eric Schnapper; NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc., 99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor, New
York, NY 10013, telephone (212) 219-1900);
Joint brief of the National Conference of Womens' Bar
Associations and Women's Bar Association of the District of
Columbia (Counsel of Record: Edith Barnett; 11104 Post
House Court, Potomac, MD 20854, telephone (301) 983-
0230);
National Employment Lawyers Association (Counsel of
Record: Margaret A. Harris; 3223 Smith, Suite 308, Houston,
TX 77006, telephone (713) 526-5677):
Joint brief of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
and 13 others (Counsel of Record: Deborah A. Ellis; NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund, 99 Hudson Street, New
York NY 10013, telephone (212) 925-6635);
Issue No. I ]Q
Joint brief of the Southern States Police Benevolent
Association and the North Carolina Police Benevolent
Association (Counsel of Record: J. Michael McGuinness;
McGuinness & Parlagreco, P.O. Box 8035, Salem, MA 01971,
telephone (508) 741- 8051);
The United States of America (William C. Bryson, Acting
Solicitor General; Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20530, telephone (202)514-2217;
Joint brief of the Women's Legal Defense Fund, the
National Women's Law Center, and 24 others (Counsel of
Record: Carolyn F. Corwin; Covington & Burling, 1201
Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20044, telephone
(202) 662-6000).
In Support of Forklift Systems, Inc.
The Equal Employment Advisory Council (Counsel of
Record: Ann Elizabeth Reesman; McGuiness & Williams, 1015
Fifteenth Street, N.W., Suite 1200, Washington, DC 20005, tele-
phone: (202) 789-8600).
In Support of Neither Party
Brief of the American Psychological Association (Counsel
of Record: Dort S. Bigg; American Psychological Association,
750 First Street, N.E., Washington, DC 20002, telephone (202)
336-6080).
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